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TAKĀFUL MODELS AND GLOBAL PRACTICES 
 
 
Waheed Akhter 
 
INTRODUCTION 
There is a global interest in Islamic finance in general and 
Takāful in particular. The main feature that differentiates Takāful 
services from conventional ones is Sharī‟ah compliance nature of these 
services. Investors are taking keen interest in this potential market as 
Muslims constitute about one fourth of the world population (Muslim 
population, 2006). To streamline operations of a Takāful company, 
management and Sharī‟ah experts have developed different 
operational models for Takāful business. Takāful model is the basis of 
the company operational activities. It provides conceptual framework 
for the operations of Takāful Company and sets a path for the flow of 
funds in the organization. All the transactions of the company 
business are carried out in the light of conceptual framework of 
Takāful model adopted by the company. A number of Takāful 
companies are successfully operating in Muslim and Arab countries 
and growing each year faster than their conventional counter parts. 
Many conventional insurance companies, showing their interest in 
Takāful, have opened Takāful windows to compete with Takāful 
companies. 
This research paper discusses different Takāful models being 
practised by Takāful operators across the world. The paper is mainly 
divided into two sections. First section discusses functioning and 
conceptual mechanism of Takāful models practised by Takāful 
operators across the world. Second section raises some fiqh related 
issues faced by Takāful operators practicing different Takāful models 
in different countries.  
 
TAKĀFUL MODELS IN PRACTICE 
Theoretically, Takāful is perceived as cooperative insurance 
(Takāful models in practice, 2006), where members contribute towards 
a common pool yet the commercialization of Takāful has produced 
several models of Islamic insurance, each reflecting a different 
experience, environment and perhaps a different school of 
thought. Currently following models are being practised in Takāful 
companies across the world. 
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TAKĀFUL TA’AWUNI (NON-PROFIT MODEL) 
 Ta‟awuni model (Billah, 2004; pp.5-8) is based on the concept of 
brotherhood, solidarity and mutual cooperation among participants to 
achieve well-being of those who are in great need of help due to a 
sudden calamity, misfortune or disaster. This model seeks to achieve 
welfare of Takāful participants and community at large. Takāful 
operator acts as a trustee on behalf of participants with no intention 
of making profit. That‟s why this model is also called non-profit model. 
The profit and underwriting surplus are distributed entirely to the 
participants.  
Let‟s consider the following example to illustrate how the 
concept of ta‟awuni model is applied. A (first party) lends his money to 
B (second party) and B manages the fund sincerely with no intention 
for profit making or benefit. Here A is the participant where B is 
Takāful operator who manages the fund. It is important to 
acknowledge that the contribution paid is actually based on the 
principles of Tabar‟ru`. A tabar‟ru` concept is rather a one-way 
transaction in which once the contribution is made, the contributor 
has no right to take any benefits out of it. The fund is used for any 
participant who faces difficulties within the time period as agreed on 
insurance policy. When the participant contributes to the fund, he is 
indirectly applying the golden principle of „bear ye one another‟s 
burden‟.  
Qardawi (n.d., p. 75) has clearly mentioned that this concept of 
mutual cooperation is absent in prevalent system of insurance. He 
says: “As far as insurance companies-especially life insurance are 
concerned, they do not satisfy these conditions in any respect because 
the insured individuals do not pay the premium as donations; such a 
thought never occurs to them…”  
Rahman (n.d., p. 24) has described that it is incorrect to imply 
that the principles of „mutuality‟ in all insurances. He asks: “How can 
all forms of insurance be mutual when this mutual character is actually 
unknown to the insurer and insured? What is the value of an economic 
interdependence among all the insured and between the insured and 
the insurer, of which neither of them is aware?”  
These findings of research scholars urge us to seriously think 
on the issue of mutual cooperation in Takāful system and to inculcate 
true Islamic spirit of cooperation among members of society so that 
benefits of implementing an Islamic insurance system could be 
achieved in reality. 
 
Global Practices 
The concept of ta‟awuni (Billah, 2004; pp.5-8) was originated in 
Sudan in 1979 when first Takāful company started its operations in 
Sudan. After that, insurance companies are bound to follow ta‟awuni 
model and adopt Takāful business by law.  Ta‟awuni model was also 
adopted and being practised by Bank al-jazira Saudi Arabia when the 
scholars realized that there is a need for cooperation in insurance 
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under the umbrella of Shari‟ah. Thus came the idea that members 
should donate their contribution to a fund (Takāful fund) to 
compensate the members in case of distress. Both the participants 
and Takāful operators should acknowledge their rights and obligations 
to the fund. The profit and underwriting surplus solely belongs to the 
participants. 
 
MUDHĀRABAH MODEL (TIJARI) 
In Takāful, Mudhārabah model is a profit sharing contract 
(Billah, 2004; pp.4-6) where participants provide capital in the form of 
contribution and Takāful operator acts as a mudarib who provides his 
management expertise to efficiently utilize the Takāful fund. It is also 
called tijari model as it works on commercial business basis. Takāful 
operator shares the profit from investment of Takāful fund and is 
responsible for all management expenses. 
In family Takāful plan, Participant‟s contribution is divided into 
two parts. The major portion of the fund goes into Participants‟ 
Account (PA) that belongs to participant whereas smaller portion is 
contained in Participants‟ Special Account (PSA) that is used to pay 
claims and underwriting costs. Entire amount of PA and PSA is 
invested in Sharī‟ah approved instruments. Profit from PA is shared 
between participants and Takāful operator according to agreed ratios. 
Profit and the amount in PSA are used to pay for claims and 
underwriting costs. In case, claims payments and underwriting costs 
exceed the amount prescribed in PSA, the loss is compensated from 
PA or shareholders may provide interest free loan (qard-e-hasana). In 
case, claims and underwriting costs are less than the amount 
available in PSA, the amount left is treated as underwriting surplus 
and shared between Takāful operator and the participants. In 
Mudhārabah model, Takāful operator claims to share in underwriting 
surplus as an incentive for efficiently managing Takāful funds. 
In general Takāful plan, there is no PA A/C and participants‟ 
contribution goes directly to PSA that may be invested and is used to 
pay for underwriting costs and claims. A portion of PSA fund after 
taking into account profit from investment can be retained as 
contingency reserve for future. Any amount left is treated as 
underwriting surplus and is shared among participants and Takāful 
operator according to agreed ratios. 
 
a. Global Practices 
Mudhārabah model has been in operation in Malaysia for almost 
20 years since the incorporation of Syarikat Takāful Malaysia in 1985, 
the first and the largest Takāful company in Malaysia. With its 
foundation firmly established, the Mudhārabah model in Malaysia has 
proven to be both viable business venture as well as profitable to 
consumers and investors alike. Besides Malaysia, Mudhārabah model 
is also being practiced in Brunei. It is reported that Takāful operators 
in Brunei have been paying almost 36% profit to their participants 
(Takāful Malaysia News bulletin, 2001). 
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b. The Model 
The Figure1 below shows a flow chart of modarbah model for 
family Takāful practiced by Syarikat Takāful Malaysia. Here, 
Participants‟ contribution is distributed in two accounts i.e. 
Participants‟ Account (PA) and Participants‟ Special Account (PSA). 
PSA is risk management account which is used to pay for the loss 
(claims payment) where as PA belongs to participant. Greater portion 
of contribution is allocated to PA as compared to PSA (e.g. 80% of the 
contribution goes to PA whereas 20% goes to PSA). Amount in both 
accounts is invested together in Sharī‟ah based instruments and profit 
is allocated proportionally to both accounts. After deducting Claims 
payment, Underwriting costs and contingency expenses from PSA, 
surplus is shared between participants and shareholders according to 
pre-determined ratios.  The whole amount in PA together with profit is 
delivered to the participant after the maturity period. 
 
FIGURE 1: MUDARBAH MODEL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Sharikat Takāful Malaysia Berhad. www.Takāful-malaysia.com 
Less: Claims 
payment/ 
Underwriting 
costs/contingency 
Reserve 
 
Participants’ 
contributions 
 
Shareholder 
Participants’ 
Special A/C (PSA) 
 
 
Investment of 
Takāful funds 
 
Participants’ A/C 
(PA) 
 
 
Participants 
 
Underwriting 
Surplus 
Shareholders 
 
Participant 
 
80% 20% 
 
20% 80% 
 
Profit 
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    Total fund          =  Rs. 88,000        Total fund             = Rs. 22,000 
 
         Less:  
     Claim payments    = Rs. (10,000) 
(10%)  
     Underwriting costs = Rs.   (5,000) 
 
  
    Surplus  = Rs.    7,000 
   
      Participants’ share = Rs.    5,600  
(80%) 
 
    
Rs.    5,600  
 
 
Accumulation to PA =Rs.  93,600 
  
HOW DOES MUDHĀRABAH MODEL WORK? 
 
FIGURE 2: FAMILY TAKĀFUL PLAN  
 
 
 
Total contribution   Rs. 100,000 
 Return on investment  10%  
 
 
Allocation to PA = Rs. 80,000  Allocation of PSA = Rs. 20,000  
(80%)      (20%)     
 
Profit (10%)       = Rs.  8,000  Profit (10%)  = Rs.    2,000  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Figure 2 shows a practical example for the flow chart of 
modarbah model for first year after receiving Takāful contribution. 
Here, it is assumed that company has initial contribution of Rs.100, 
000 that is distributed into two accounts i.e. a greater portion 
(Rs.80,000) goes to Participants‟ Account (PA) whereas smaller portion 
(Rs.20,000) is kept for Participants‟ Special Account (PSA) to cover the 
loss (claims payment) as it occurs to any of the participants. Amount 
in both accounts is invested together in Sharī‟ah based instruments 
and profit is allocated proportionally to both accounts. Assuming a 
profit of 10% from the investment of Takāful fund, Rs.8000 goes to PA 
whereas Rs.2000 goes to PSA. Adding the profit, amount in PA 
reaches toRs.88,000 and amount in PSA becomes Rs.22,000. Claim 
ratio is assumed to be 10% while underwriting cost is estimated as 5% 
of the total contribution for the first year. After deducting Claims 
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payment and underwriting costs from PSA, surplus of Rs.7000 is 
obtained that is shared between participants and shareholders 
according to pre-determined ratios. 80% of the surplus (Rs.5600) goes 
to PA while 20% (Rs.1400) goes to PSA. After adding participant‟s 
share, amount in PA becomes Rs.93,600. It is used as an opening 
account for the second year. 
 
 
WAKALĀH MODEL 
Wakalāh model is a fee driven Islamic contract in which one 
party provides capital whereas other party manages the funds. Here, 
other party charges a fixed fee instead of profit sharing as in 
Mudhārabah contract for providing its managerial services to 
prudently invest and manage the funds. In Takāful contract, 
participants provide capital in the form of contribution and Takāful 
operator manages the funds and charges a fixed fee (called a Wakalāh 
fee) for providing its services (Whear & Western, 2006). The Wakalāh 
fee should be fair and appropriate and should be determined and 
approved by Sharī‟ah Supervisory Board (SSB). Wakalāh model is 
considered more transparent than Mudhārabah model as charges are 
fixed and predetermined by the both parties. There are no hidden 
charges. Some Takāful operators charge an additional fee on surplus 
as an incentive to efficiently manage the funds.    
 
Global Practices 
Wakalāh model has been practiced by Bank Al-Jazira, Saudi 
Arabia. It is also being practiced by Commerce Takāful Berhad and 
Takāful Ikhlas Sdn. Berhad in Malaysia. Government of Bahrain has 
also taken the initiative to make compulsory for Takāful and Re-
takāful  companies to adopt Wakalāh model in their business (Al 
Sadah, 2005). This model is gaining popularity across the world due 
to its transparency and fixed nature of charges irrespective of the 
amount of Takāful contribution received as it provides leverage for the 
company to act in the best interests of participants and enhance their 
returns. Moreover, there are less Sharī‟ah related issues associated to 
this model that might create conflicts of interests among Sharī‟ah 
scholars of different schools of thoughts. 
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Fees 
 
FIGURE 3: WAKALĀH MODEL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bank Al-Jazira, Saudi Arabia. www.baj.com.sa    
 
 
When Takāful contribution is paid by the participants, Wakalāh 
fee is deducted as upfront charge. The Figure 3 shows a flow chart of 
Wakalāh model for family Takāful practiced by Bank Al-Jazira of 
Saudi Arabia. Here, agents‟ commission is directly drawn from 
Participants‟ contribution as upfront charge. The remaining amount is 
distributed in two accounts i.e. Individual saving account and Risk 
account to cover the loss of affected participants. Individual saving 
account is each participant‟s personal account that is used for future 
savings. Risk account is also known as tabar‟ru account as 
participants agree to donate a portion of their contribution to this 
fund which is used to pay for claims, underwriting costs and Re-
Participants’ 
contribution 
Risk A/C  
(tabar’ru) 
Individual 
saving A/C 
Investment Profit 
Takāful Operator fees/ 
Agents’ commission  
Claims/Direct 
costs/Reserve 
Risk A/C 
(tabar’ru) 
 
Individual saving/ 
Participant’s A/C 
 
Surplus 
Fees 
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Takāful contribution   = Rs. 100,000 
Agents’ commission (35%)    =  Rs.  (35,000) 
 
Amount available for   
Risk fund (tabarru)   =  Rs.   65,000 
 
Profit from investment (10%) =  Rs.     6,500 
 
Risk fund   =  Rs.   71,500 
Claims payment/direct  
Expenses (40%)  =  Rs.  (40,000) 
 
Underwriting Surplus  =  Rs.   31,500  
 
Wakalāh fee on surplus (10%) =  Rs.   (3,150) 
 
Contingency Reserve (10%)  =  Rs.   (3,150) 
 
 
Participants’ share in surplus =  Rs.   25,200 or  
 
        25.20% 
  
takāful expenses. Amount in both accounts is invested under Sharī‟ah 
guidelines and profit obtained from investment is appropriated to both 
accounts according to their original ratio. Any surplus left from risk 
account goes to individual saving account. Sometimes, Takāful 
company charges a compensation fee on the amount of surplus as a 
return for its efficiency and prudent underwriting skills.  
 
 
HOW DOES WAKALĀH MODEL WORK? 
 
FIGURE 4: GENERAL TAKĀFUL PLAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Figure 4 shows a practical example for the flow chart of 
Wakalāh model for general Takāful after receiving Takāful 
contribution. Here, it is assumed that company has initial 
contribution of Rs.100,000 from which 35% agents‟ commission is 
deducted as upfront charge. The remaining amount of Rs.65,000 goes 
to risk fund and is invested in Sharī‟ah based instruments. 10% profit 
is assumed from investment of risk fund. After adding the investment 
profit, risk fund moves to Rs.71,500. Claim payment and direct 
expenses including underwriting are assumed to be 40%. After 
deducting Claims payment and direct expenses from risk fund, 
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underwriting surplus of Rs.31,500 is obtained. 10% of underwriting 
surplus is deducted as Wakalāh fee while another 10% is kept as 
contingency reserve. Remaining amount of surplus i.e. Rs.25,200 is 
distributed among participants who have no prior claims. It indicates 
that participants of general Takāful can be compensated with surplus 
share of more than 25% by the use of prudent underwriting 
mechanism. Sometimes, surplus share is used to pay for the 
contribution of next year in which case, participants have to pay less 
contribution to the extent of their share in underwriting surplus. 
 
 
MIXED MODEL (MUDHĀRABAH + WAKALĀH) 
Mixed model is a combination of al-Mudhārabah and al-Wakalāh 
model where al-Wakalāh contract is used for underwriting activities 
while al-Mudhārabah contract is adopted for investment activities 
(Tolefat, 2006). With regard to underwriting activities, the 
shareholders act as the wakeel (agent) on behalf of participants to 
manage their funds whereby the Takāful company (shareholders) 
receives contribution, pay claims, arrange Re-takāful  and all other 
necessary actions related to Takāful business. In exchange for 
performing these tasks, the company charges each participant a fee 
known as a Wakalāh fee, which is usually a percentage of the 
contribution paid by each participant. On the investment side, the 
company invests the surplus contributions in Sharī‟ah based 
instruments based on Al-Mudhārabah contract, whereby the company 
acts as mudarib on behalf of participants (Rab-al-maal or capital 
providers). However, in order to satisfy the Sharī‟ah requirement for 
Al-Mudhārabah contract, the ratio of profit is fixed and agreed upon 
between the two parties, at the inception of the contract. 
Proponents of this model argue that a Mudhārabah arrangement 
is better suited for management and investment of Takāful fund 
(Obaidullah, 2005; p.148) and provides incentive to Takāful operator 
to optimize its return by sharing profit. The Wakalāh model is perhaps 
better suited than the Mudhārabah for managing the Takāful business 
for the agency fee (cost of insurance). It is more transparent and is 
free from the controversial charging of expenses (including marketing 
commissions) to the Takāful fund. These arrangements need to be 
considered as a part of efforts to search for an optimal model of 
Takāful as well as to create harmony among existing Takāful models.  
 
Global Practices 
The mixed model of Al-wakalah/Al-mudaraba (Tolefat, 2006), is 
the dominant model in the Middle East market and it is widely 
practiced by Takāful companies worldwide. In Malaysia, it is being 
practiced by Takāful Nasional Berhad and Mayban Takāful Berhad 
(MTB). Proponents of this model argue (Obaidullah, 2005) that as this 
model combines the benefits of mudaraba as well as Wakalāh model 
so it could facilitate the search for a unified approach to standardize 
Takāful practices across the world.  
 10 
 
 
FIGURE 5: MIXED MODEL (MUDARBAH + WAKALAH) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Takāful Nasional Bhd. Malaysia. www.Takāfulnasional.com.my  
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HOW DOES MIXED MODEL WORK? 
 
FIGURE 6: FAMILY TAKĀFUL PLAN  
 
 
Takāful contribution = Rs. 100,000 
 
  
   
 
           PSA (30%)          PA (70%)
  
     Rs. 30,000           Rs. 70,000 
 
Profit (10%)  = Rs.3, 000    Rs. 7,000  
 
PSA fund      = Rs. 33,000 
Less:  
Claims (10%)  = Rs. (10,000)      Participants‟       Company‟s 
Share(80%)      Share (20%) 
Underwriting costs = Rs.  (5,000) 
Commission   = Rs. (15,000) Rs. 5,600          Rs.1,400
             
 
Surplus      = Rs.  3,000 Rs. 75,600  
Rs.   2,400 
 
Rs. 78,000           
         Rs.  600 
                
          Rs.   2,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the Figure 6, it could be seen that Takāful company applies a 
mixed approach for the management of Takāful fund. It uses Wakalāh 
concept for PSA account when it charges commission as a fee. It uses 
Mudhārabah concept when it invests the amount of PA account and 
shares in the profit from the investment and underwriting surplus 
according to agreed ratios. Participants‟ share of surplus together with 
their share of profit from investment is added to their PA account.  
 
 
 
 
20% 
80% 
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WAKALĀH MODEL WITH WAQF FUND 
After several objections were raised regarding the issue of 
surplus sharing in Mudhārabah model and modified modarbah model 
and their legal status.  A need was felt to develop a model that could 
work towards building the creditability of Takāful operator as a 
welfare institution rather than a profit oriented entity. This lead to the 
formation of Wakalāh Model with Waqf fund that was approved by 
Sharī‟ah scholars of Darul Uloom Karachi, the most famous and 
credible Islamic institution in Pakistan. The model is a modified form 
of Wakalāh model where a Waqf fund is created by initial donation of 
shareholders. Participants‟ contribution goes directly to Waqf fund. 
Takāful operator deducts its fees from Waqf fund. The remaining 
amount is invested in Sharī‟ah based instruments. The profit from 
investment is shared between Takāful operator and participants 
according to agreed ratios. After deducting claims, Re-takāful expenses 
and underwriting costs, 100% net surplus belongs to participants who 
have no prior claims and distributed to them according to their 
proportion of contribution. 
 
Global Practices 
Wakalāh Model with Waqf fund is being practiced by Takāful 
operators of Pakistan. This model has also been adopted by Takāful 
operators of South Africa (Tolefat, 2006). This model is a modified 
form of Wakalāh model. In this modified Wakalāh model with Waqf 
fund, the relationship of the participants and of the operator is 
directly with the Waqf fund. The operator is the wakeel of the Waqf 
fund and the participants pay one sided donation to the Waqf fund 
(not conditional) The Waqf fund rules (Abdul Wahab, 2006) may define 
the sharing of surplus and other rules under which it would operate 
but without having any obligation to distribute surplus. 
 
The Figure 7 shows a flow chart diagram of Wakalāh model with 
Waqf fund for general Takāful after receiving Takāful contribution. 
According to this model, first a Waqf fund is created by the joint 
efforts of participants as well as shareholders who initially donate 
their contribution to this fund. Here, Takāful operator fees (also called 
Wakalāh fee) are directly drawn from Waqf fund. The remaining 
amount is invested on the basis of modarbah under Sharī‟ah 
guidelines and profit obtained from investment is shared between 
participants and Takāful operator according to their mutual terms of 
agreement. Takāful operator is responsible for all the management 
expenses from shareholders‟ fund. Operating costs, Re-takāful  
expenses and claim payments are made from participants‟ fund. Any 
surplus left after deducting all the related expenses belongs to 
participants. Sometimes, Takāful company retains a portion of 
underwriting surplus as a contingency reserve to meet any sudden 
and unexpected future cost.   
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FIGURE 7: WAKALAH MODEL WITH WAQF FUND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Takāful Pakistan Limited, www.Takāful.com.pk  
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ISSUES IN TAKĀFUL MODELS 
 
Sharī‟ah scholars who belong to different schools of thoughts 
have different point of views on Sharī‟ah matters. This has created 
certain fiqh related issues in Takāful models being practised by 
Takāful operators across the world. Abdel Karim and Archer (2002) 
have identified corporate governance, regulatory and accounting 
issues that affect the functioning of Islamic financial institutions 
including insurance companies. Ismail (2004) discussed the issues in 
modified Mudhārabah model at a workshop at Bank Negara, Central 
Bank of Malaysia. Billah (2004) gives gross root reasons for having 
diversified Takāful models and also discusses their possible solutions. 
Khanzada (2007) also highlights issues in Takāful industry in 
Pakistan under Waqf model. Based on the views of above researchers, 
key issues that have been found in different Takāful models are 
summarized as follow:   
 
i. Sharī’ah issues: 
 
Sharī‟ah issues arise as different Takāful models are being 
practised in different countries. Sharī‟ah scholars who provide 
Sharī‟ah supervisory services to Takāful operators belong to different 
schools of thoughts (e.g. Hanafi, Shaafi, Humbali, Maaliki etc.) 
propagate different opinion on Sharī‟ah matters according to their 
belief in particular school of thought. Grais and Pellegrini (2006, 
pp.17-21) identify issues of independence, confidentiality, 
competence, consistency and disclosure of responsibilities that affect 
functioning of SSB in the organization. Due to lack of competent 
Sharī‟ah scholars in the field of Islamic finance, most of the scholars 
hold positions in Sharī‟ah Supervisory Boards (SSBs) of several 
companies. This may jeopardize the confidentiality of the company 
secret information and company may restrict SSB to access certain 
information and hence affect its independence in the organization. 
SSB decisions on Sharī‟ah matters might not be consistent as the 
company might not properly disclose the responsibilities of SSB and 
restrict their authority in certain areas. 
Sharī‟ah supervisory board (SSB) strictly ensures Sharī‟ah 
compliance of Takāful fund and only approves those investment 
avenues that are compatible with Shari‟ah. For example, investment 
in alcohol production or liquor business is not allowed in Shari‟ah. 
Though investment of Takāful fund is made in consultation with the 
members of SSB, yet there are chances that some part of income from 
investment might be considered as illegal from Sharī‟ah point of view 
e.g. company invests in an airline or hotel business that apparently 
seems to be permissible under Sharī‟ah but it has debt financing in its 
capital structure or it has derived a part of its income from sale of 
alcohol or liquor (Abdel Karim & Archer, 2002; p.71).   
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ii. Profit sharing: 
Critics on the issue of profit sharing argue that it is illegal for 
participants as well as for Takāful operators to share in profits as is 
the case in Mudhārabah model. For participants, the issue arises as a 
result of tabarru nature of contribution. A group of Sharī‟ah scholar is 
of the view that as participants pay the contribution as donation so 
from Sharī‟ah point of view, they cannot receive any profit from 
donated amount. Similarly, since Takāful operators acts as a trustee 
and manger of funds and its responsibility is to act in the best 
interests of shareholders. Also the remuneration and salaries of 
managers are fixed and approved by board of directors, so Takāful 
operator should not be allowed to share the profit but only entitled to 
fixed charges. The same issues arise for modified Mudhārabah model. 
 
iii. Underwriting surplus sharing: 
Issue of underwriting surplus sharing is similar to that of profit 
sharing. Sharī‟ah scholars argue that Participants are not allowed to 
share in the surplus of the amount (Takāful contribution) which they 
have already donated to tabar‟ru fund. Similarly Takāful operators 
have no right to share the surplus amount as they have already 
received Wakalāh fee or their share of profit. Now the question arises 
if neither participants nor Takāful operator has legal right on the 
underwriting surplus, where this amount should go. A group of 
Sharī‟ah scholars is of the view that this amount should go to a Waqf 
fund for charitable purpose and should be used for the welfare of poor 
and needy people of the society who are not real members of Takāful 
company. Another group of scholars propose that underwriting 
surplus could be returned to the participants as „hibah‟ (gift). 
 
iv. Unearned Wakalāh fee: 
 Wakalāh fee (agents‟ commission) is usually charged in advance 
as upfront charge when participant pays contribution amount. 
According to accrual principle of accounting, Wakalāh fee will be 
earned at the end of Takāful period for a particular year. Takāful 
operators claim that participant‟s contribution will be refunded 
whenever he wants to withdraw the contract. Only Wakalāh fee is 
deducted from the contribution amount. The question arises if any 
participant withdraws his contract at the mid of Takāful period, has 
Takāful operator any right on unearned Wakalāh fee? If not then how 
should unearned Wakalāh fee be returned to the participant when 
Takāful operator deducts it in advance and pays to Takāful agents as 
commission. 
 
v. Legal status of Waqf fund: 
Waqf fund is created by initial donations from shareholders‟ 
fund. Then Takāful contribution, income from investment, 
underwriting surplus is added to Waqf fund. Yet Waqf model raises 
questions about its legal status. Should this fund fall under the 
purview of trust act or any other act? Is Takāful operator bound to 
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comply with provisions of trust act or any other act in addition to 
Takāful regulations? What are the tax implications of treating Waqf 
fund as separate entity or not a separate entity from Takāful 
Company? These questions require clarification from legal and 
Sharī‟ah experts related to Takāful business. 
 
vi. Corporate Governance issues: 
 Adoption of a Takāful model raises issues of corporate 
governance regarding the rights of participants who are the provider of 
funds for the Takāful Company. Although Takāful operators act as a 
trustee and manager of funds and get their share of profit in the form 
of Mudhārabah or Wakalāh fee, yet they have been criticized for 
maximizing the shareholders‟ profits while ignoring the rights of 
participants that are major stakeholders of the company. In the 
absence of proper corporate governance practices, company and its 
board of directors are not held accountable for their decisions that are 
not favorable to participants or community at large. Moreover, 
participants are not given positions in the board of directors so they 
have no right to question any decision of the board and feel 
themselves insecure (Abdel Karim & Archer, 2002; p.72). 
Strengthening the regulatory framework is essential to regulate the 
activities of Takāful operators and to protect the rights of participants.   
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Five types of Takāful models, as identified in this research 
paper, are being practised across the world. Each Takāful model has 
evolved in a more refined form as a result of certain issues associated 
with the previous model. Fiqh related issues arise in Takāful models 
as Sharī‟ah Scholars belonging to different schools of thoughts have 
different point of views on Sharī‟ah matters. Sharī‟ah issues are 
concerned with the independence, confidentiality, competence, 
consistency and disclosure of responsibilities that affect functioning of 
SSB in the organizations. Critics on the issue of profit sharing argue 
that it is illegal for participants as well as for Takāful operators to 
share in profits due to tabarru nature (donation) of contribution. Issue 
of underwriting surplus sharing prevents Takāful operators to share 
the surplus amount and restricts their earning to Wakalāh fee or their 
share of profit. Issue of unearned Wakalāh fee arises when a 
participant withdraws his contract at the mid of Takāful period, as fee 
is usually charged in advance as upfront charge when participant 
pays contribution amount. Wakalāh model with Waqf fund has been 
approved by Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan after its 
approval by Islamic Ideological Council and Ulema of Darul Uloom. It 
takes into account all the related issues of previous Takāful models. 
So it is considered to be the most refined and acceptable model. Yet 
there is need to create consensus among Sharī‟ah Scholars belonging 
to different schools of thoughts. A central Sharī‟ah Board comprising 
of different Sharī‟ah Scholars representing their own fiqh is highly 
desirable as it can resolve various issues that can create conflict of 
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interest among different fiqhs. There is also need to counter corporate 
governance issues that raise the concern for the accountability of 
company board of directors as they have been criticized for 
maximizing the shareholders‟ profits while ignoring the rights of 
participants. Sharī‟ah based corporate governance practices are 
considered very much important for Islamic financial institutions 
including Takāful companies to create transparency and fairness in 
their operations.  
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